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Abstract
There has been increasing interest in the so-called ‘resource curse’: the tendency of 
resource-rich countries to underperform in several socio-economic outcomes. More 
recently, several papers have looked beyond the traditional impact on economic growth and 
instead focused on the effects upon broader human welfare indicators. A separate empirical 
literature in recent decades has probed into the determinants of happiness and subjective 
well-being (using either country or household data). Our paper contributes to the literature 
by bringing these two empirical strands of research together. This is the first study, to our 
knowledge, that makes use of a large panel dataset to explore the links between changes in 
happiness across countries and several measures of resource wealth. Consistent with prior 
empirical evidence of a resource curse in oil-rich nations, we find that oil rents are nega-
tively linked to improvements in happiness over time. This happiness ‘resource curse’ curse 
appears to be oil-specific and holds both for the levels as well as changes in happiness.
Keywords Resource curse · Mining · Happiness · Cross-country analysis
1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a burgeoning literature researching the links between 
resource abundance and several measures of economic performance. Much of the so-called 
resource curse literature has developed theoretical and empirical research explaining the 
negative correlation observed between several measures of mineral wealth and long-term 
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economic growth (Baggio and Papyrakis 2010; Murshed and Serino 2011; Papyrakis 
2014). Much of this literature (to which this paper belongs) pays particular attention to oil 
and its correlates.1
While the resource curse literature initially focused attention on economic growth, it 
gradually widened its scope to broader welfare variables. For example, Bulte et al. (2005) 
and Daniele (2011) claimed that mineral resource rents are associated with lower values of 
the Human Development Index (a composite development index of life expectancy, educa-
tion and GDP per capita), undernourishment, higher child mortality and limited access to 
safe water. Deaton and Niman (2012) and Pegg (2006) provide evidence of a poor empiri-
cal track record of poverty alleviation in mineral dependent economies. Several papers in 
the field of ecological economics have also linked mineral wealth to low scores of sustain-
able development indices (such as the genuine savings and genuine income measurements; 
see Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Dietz and Neumayer 2007).
In parallel (but regrettably independently) a separate empirical literature in recent dec-
ades has probed into the determinants of happiness and subjective well-being (using either 
country or household data). Several of these papers examine the importance of absolute, 
relative and past income in explaining variations in reported happiness (see Asadullah et al. 
2018; Clark et al. 2008). Some of them are in support of the so-called Easterlin paradox, 
suggesting that increasing average income (at the country level) yields diminishing mar-
ginal gains in average happiness (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Easterlin and Angelescu 
2012; di Tella and MacCulloch 2008). Several other socio-economic and environmental 
factors appear to explain variation in reported happiness (e.g., unemployment and inflation, 
see di Tella et  al. 2001, education levels, see Caner 2016, corruption, see Welsch 2008; 
trade, see Hessami 2011 and environmental quality, see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy 
2007).
So far, there has been no attempt to bring these two empirical traditions of research 
together and explore whether resource-rich countries find it more difficult, other things 
equal, to translate their resource wealth into happiness gains (i.e. a ‘happiness resource 
curse’). Our paper contributes to the literature by bringing these two empirical streams of 
research together. This is the first study, to our knowledge, that makes use of a large panel 
dataset to explore the links between changes in happiness across countries and several 
measures of resource wealth. Consistent with prior empirical evidence of a resource curse 
in oil-rich nations, we find that oil rents are negatively linked to improvements in happiness 
over time. This happiness ‘resource curse’ curse appears to be oil-specific and holds both 
for the levels as well as changes in happiness.
The next section consists of a theoretical note on happiness and the resource curse that 
can serve as a formal framework of analysis for subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides a 
brief literature review on happiness and its correlates (with an emphasis on the role of nat-
ural resource rents). Sections 2 and 3 together provide the justification behind the empirical 
specifications that are tested in subsequent sections. Section 4 is devoted to our empirical 
analysis on happiness changes and resource wealth, where we disaggregate the analysis 
per type of natural resource (abundance/dependence) measure. In Sect.  5 we extend our 
analysis by looking at how happiness levels (rather than changes over time) correlate with 
1 E.g. for the case of economic growth, see Khanna (2017), conflict, see Lujala (2010), gender and broader 
income inequality, see Ross (2008) and Parcero and Papyrakis (2016), bureaucratic efficiency, see Goldberg 
et al. (2008).
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our measures of resource affluence. Section  6 summarises our main findings and offers 
concluding remarks.
2  A Theoretical Note on Happiness and the Resource Curse
The microeconomic literature on happiness focuses on the utility of an individual house-
hold. Following Clarke et al. (2008) and Layard (1980), this utility can be summarised to 
(largely) depend positively on four variables. These are individual consumption (related to 
household income) but at the usual diminishing rates, the household’s income relative to 
the average or mean income in society, expected future income and leisure. This theoretical 
framework also assumes that there is some happiness adaptation to income gains; i.e. indi-
viduals become accustomed to higher income and consumption levels, and the consequent 
rise in happiness tends to diminish after the initial periods.
Moving on to a more aggregative view of happiness (which involves summing indi-
vidual utilities in one country and arriving at some utilitarian welfare function, and then 
making the same comparison across countries) entails a number of steps and simplifica-
tions, particularly to carry out empirical investigation. Measured national average utility 
levels are expected to positively correlate with average per-capita income (GDP) levels. 
Growth in per-capita income captures expected improvements in average income over time 
(which helps offset the aforementioned adaptation effect). The relative income variable 
may explain a large part of the variation in utility levels across individuals (as a result of 
the status associated with higher income levels with respect to others), but it is less likely 
to do so at the more aggregate country level (the higher status of any individual gives rise 
to a lower status for all the rest in the economy, leading hence to a ‘zero-sum game’ on 
the whole, see Clark et al. 2008, p. 101). Nevertheless, there might be an aggregate nega-
tive correlation between income inequality (e.g. the Gini coefficient) and average utility, 
if, on average, individuals tend to have a preference for more egalitarian societies (Baggio 
and Papyrakis 2014). Then, as discussed earlier, individual valuation of labour could be 
replaced by societal (and individual) distaste for unemployment. We could further add util-
ity from public goods, as in the case of educational expenditure. Across countries, happi-
ness may also vary along with differences in institutions, e.g. captured by variations in the 
rule of law, control of corruption and the degree of democracy.
Resource dependent countries are deemed to have poorer institutions relative to less 
resource dependent nations, causing their citizens to be less happy on average. Secondly, 
expected income can fluctuate considerably along with commodity price volatility, espe-
cially in the case of oil prices. Thirdly, resource windfall gains and temporary increases 
in income may create few happiness gains to the extent that short-sighted governments in 
mineral-rich contexts do not aim for an equitable distribution of rents and investment in 
productive capacity. Natural resource booms and discoveries can create short-term income 
shocks with corresponding happiness gains, which can, though, be sustained only tempo-
rarily if resource-rich economies underperform in the long run (as it is often the case). 
Fourthly, although the happiness measure is an average for a nation based on representa-
tive surveys, the response rate to these surveys may be biased towards median individuals, 
who in the case of resource rich countries may be experiencing a relative decline in income 
compared to mean or per-capita income changes. This will happen with a greater concen-
tration of wealth at the top, which is more likely in resource rich countries with poor insti-
tutional constraints and structures. Finally, resource-dependent economies tend to be less 
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diversified and with exports dominated by primary commodities; as a result, employment 
in the traded sectors is lower than in more diversified economies, along with the forward 
and backward linkages to employment in other sectors.
We may, hence, write a happiness function (H) as a function of several arguments:
 where Y is the level of per-capita income, G is growth of income per capita, I refers to 
institutional quality, P stands for public goods, W stands for work or employment and the 
last argument, R/Y, is a measure of resource dependence. Happiness is expected to vary 
positively with all the arguments in the function above, with the exception of resource 
dependence. Some of the right-hand side arguments may also correlate with one another to 
some extent (e.g. richer economies may be able to afford better institutions and invest more 
in public good provision). In addition, mineral resources may affect growth prospects or 
institutional development in accordance with the resource curse hypothesis—these endoge-
neity issues will be reflected upon in the empirical Sect. 4.
3  Happiness and the Resource Curse: A Brief Literature Review
In this section we discuss the mechanisms that are likely to link happiness to resource rents, 
as well as other possible explanatory factors.2 The theoretical mechanisms presented will 
then shape the specifications that will be empirically tested in Sects. 4 and 5 of the paper.
3.1  Happiness and Resource Wealth
Resource rents may, in principle, be associated with larger happiness gains if the revenues 
become redistributed equitably and become invested in activities that enhance welfare (e.g. 
large public investment projects). On the other hand, it is likely that oil rich nations, in 
particular, fail to translate their resource wealth into increased happiness for the same rea-
sons that often prevent them from experiencing faster economic growth. Some of these 
reasons may simply relate to how petrostate economies typically function; oil rents might 
fail to support happiness gains over time whenever they generally disadvantage activities in 
the non-oil sectors via Dutch Disease effects (where the majority of job opportunities are 
located; e.g. see Beine et al. 2012). Similarly, oil enclaves might create few spillovers to 
the rest of the economy (often as a result of their geographical clustering, either offshore or 
in few remote places onshore, e.g. see Auty 2006). In addition, changes in happiness may 
simply be influenced by the inability of many oil-rich countries to raise living standards or 
the macroeconomic volatility experienced as a result of fluctuating oil prices (see van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009).
A general feeling of dissatisfaction might also arise as a result of bad governance (a typ-
ical feature of many mineral rich economies) and the corresponding inefficient allocation 
of public revenues (based on rent-seeking rather than expected returns; Brollo et al. 2013). 
Oil rich countries are often characterised by weak rule of law and a high risk of expropria-
tion, malfunctioning bureaucracies and endemic corruption (see Kolstad and Wiig 2009). 
H = f (Y ,G, I,P,W,R∕Y),
2 For some excellent and more detailed reviews of the literature, see Radcliffe (2013), Weimann et  al. 
(2015).
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The geographic clustering of mineral resource also intensifies (often pre-existing) power 
struggles and grievances across different interest groups (which are often divided across 
ethnic/religious lines; see Baggio and Papyrakis 2010; Hodler 2006). Furthermore, the lim-
ited democratic accountability typically found in authoritarian oil-rich states can further 
enhance the general dissatisfaction arising from the mismanagement of mineral rents (and 
public resources more broadly; Tsui 2011).
Figure 1 presents a scatterplot linking changes in reported happiness (between 2009 and 
2012) to the initial level of oil dependence. Happiness is proxied by the Gallup World Poll 
measure of average subjective well-being (a measure of average reported satisfaction with 
life of the residents of each country, with scale from 0 to 10; see Gallup World Poll 2017). 
Oil dependence is measured as the share of oil rents in GDP (data provided by the World 
Bank 2016). Negative happiness changes characterise both oil rich and scarce economies; 
however, for high levels of oil dependency (where oil accounts for more than 10% of GDP), 
there is a much larger proportion of countries experiencing a negative change (please note 
that the horizontal red line now corresponds to no change in happiness—the vertical red 
line denotes a level of oil dependence equal to 10%). 
3.2  Happiness and Income
Several empirical analyses argue that increased income does indeed ‘buy happiness’, 
although at a diminishing rate: i.e. there is a positive but concave relationship between 
happiness proxies and average income (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Easterlin and 
Angelescu 2012; di Tella and MacCulloch 2008). This is in line with the so-called East-
erlin paradox, suggesting that the relationship between happiness and average income flat-
tens out for sufficiently high levels of economic development (see Easterlin 1974, 2015). 
Economic growth, hence, results in happiness gains primarily for low-income countries, 
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Fig. 1  Change in happiness and oil dependence. Note: Abbreviations correspond to 3-letter country ISO 
codes
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where improvements in income levels allows access to some of the basic necessities of 
life (FitzRoy et al. 2012). In addition, while individuals tend to be also concerned about 
their relative income, this status return from having higher income with respect to a refer-
ence group has little impact on country-level happiness over time. Individuals also tend to 
quickly adjust to increased income levels (in other words, there is an adaptation/habituation 
effect, where any positive happiness effects of increases in income tend to fade away over 
time; di Tella et al. 2010).
3.3  Other Correlates
Several studies provide empirical support to a strong negative correlation between happi-
ness and unemployment (as a result of the associated insecurity and anxiety that job-loss 
brings about; see Blanchflower et  al. 2014). Other things equal, unemployed individuals 
tend to experience reduced life-satisfaction scores by approximately 5–20% (Di Tella et al. 
2001; Lelkes 2006). There is also evidence suggesting that unemployment has a persistent 
effect on happiness (i.e. it does not decline with the length of unemployment; see Knabe 
and Rätzel 2011).
There is also some tentative evidence pointing to a positive relationship between edu-
cation and happiness (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Cuñado and de Gracia 2012). For 
many, education has an intrinsic value since it provides an opportunity for self-improve-
ment and broadening one’s interests and understanding of the social world. Some studies, 
though, find no significant effect of education on happiness (e.g. Flouri 2004) or even a 
negative one (Caner 2016). This might be explained by the fact that education often cor-
relates positively with income levels (as well as often unfulfilled income aspirations). As 
a result of this, controlling for income levels might make any positive significant statisti-
cal relationship between education and happiness to disappear (see Graham and Pettinato 
2001).
Several studies claim that inflation can potentially reduce happiness—individuals tend 
to dislike inflation because of the ensuing uncertainty regarding changes in the cost of liv-
ing and real income (see Shiller 1997). In general, studies find that unemployment tends 
to be much more harmful than inflation in terms of happiness losses (e.g. see Di Tella 
et al. 2001, 2003), although there seems to be no significant effect when one uses aggregate 
country data (see Bjørnskov 2003 and Ovaska and Takashima 2006). There is also some 
ambiguity regarding the relationship between trade openness and average happiness—
while trade expansion has the potential for job creation and lower prices, efforts for freer 
trade worldwide often face stiff resistance (as a result of fear of displacement of domestic 
workers and closure of local industries). Many studies, hence, find a negative relationship 
between measures of trade openness and changes in happiness (e.g. di Tella and MacCull-
och 2008; Hessami 2011; Ovaska and Takashima 2006).
Several scholars claim that environmental problems have a detrimental effect on happi-
ness—individuals tend to value the local and global ecosystem services provided by natu-
ral habitats (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy 2007; Li et al. 2014). Other things equal, those 
living in polluted areas tend to report lower scores of subjective well-being (see Ferreira 
et al. 2013). There is also some evidence suggesting a positive link between transparency 
and happiness. Trust in public institutions, the legal system and the government is asso-
ciated with higher happiness levels (Hudson 2006). Most individuals express preference 
for a strong rule of law system, that shields against meritocracy and prevents inefficiency, 
unfairness and criminal activity (Tavits 2008).
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4  Happiness and the Resource Curse: Regression Analysis
4.1  Data and Estimation
In this section we examine the dependence of changes in happiness on natural resource 
wealth, as well as on a vector of other explanatory variables that have been found to be sig-
nificant happiness correlates in the literature. We are especially interested in the sign of the 
correlation between our measures of natural resources and happiness (given the large evi-
dence in the resource curse literature pointing to inferior development outcomes particu-
larly in mineral rich economies; Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015; Ross 2015). It is also 
of interest to explore whether there is a differentiated impact of different types of natural 
resources on happiness changes—several studies have suggested that point resources (oil, 
other minerals) are more strongly associated with inferior development outcomes than dif-
fuse resources (agriculture), e.g. see Bulte et al. (2005), Boschini et al. (2013) and Leder-
man and Maloney (2007).3 To identify the dependence of changes in happiness on different 
natural resource measures we estimate a series of cross-country panel regressions. For the 
purposes of our analysis the following empirical specification is estimated:
where ΔHappinessit corresponds to changes in happiness for country i at time t, Resource 
Dependencei(t−1) refers to the value of each natural resource sector in total economic activ-
ity (in the previous year). Zi(t−1) corresponds to the vector of (1-year lagged) control vari-
ables found to explain variation in happiness across countries in the literature (e.g., income 
per capita, economic growth, unemployment, education, etc.; see Sect.  2) and  ui and εit 
are the country-specific (time-invariant) and variable components of the error term respec-
tively.4 Our panel data analysis covers the 2000–2012 period.
We opt for a random effects estimation, given that this leads to more efficient param-
eter estimates for variables exhibiting limited time variation (as it is the case for a number 
of our happiness determinants, e.g. the indices of resource dependence, education, cor-
ruption and income per capita—for a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Hsiao 
2007; Neumayer 2004; Wooldridge 2010). Random effects explore both the between and 
within country variation (while fixed effects focus only on the latter). The standard errors 
of variables that fluctuate little over time typically become inflated in the case of fixed-
effects estimators. This is not surprising given that fixed effects estimations involve ‘time 
demeaning’ variables to remove time-invariant observables (and as a result, time invariant 
variables drop out in fixed-effects regressions, while variables with limited time fluctuation 
typically become statistically insignificant). A recent example is the analysis by Corrigan 
(2014) who demonstrates how regressors typically found to be significant determinants of 
institutional quality (income per capita and democracy) become statistically insignificant in 
a fixed-effects setting.5 In the same vein, when we replicate our random-effects estimations 
(1)ΔHappinessit = 훼0 + 훼1ResourceDependencei(t−1) + 훼2Zi(t−1) + ui + 휀it,
3 This is likely to be attributed to the geographical concentration and appropriability of different resource 
types (which tend to be high for the oil industry).
4 “Appendix 1” lists countries in the sample (for the richer oil specification of Table  1). “Appendix 2” 
presents a correlation matrix for all regressors and “Appendix 3” provides variable descriptions and data 
sources. Descriptive statistics are presented in “Appendix 4”.
5 There are also several critiques of the Hausman test (as a means to choose between random and fixed 
effects estimators) in cases of variables exhibiting little variation over time (Baltagi 2011, p. 321; Clark and 
Linzer 2015).
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using fixed-effects most variables lose statistical significance (and typically our random 
effects estimations are closer to the pooled-OLS estimations given the larger variation 
across space than time).6
4.2  Results and Discussion
We present our empirical estimations in Table  1. Our dependent variable (ΔHappiness) 
measures the change in average reported happiness (between 2000–2003, 2003–2006, 
2006–2009 and 2009–2012). Happiness is proxied by the Gallup World Poll measure of 
average subjective well-being (a measure of average reported satisfaction with life of the 
residents of each country, with scale from 0 to 10—larger values correspond to higher lev-
els of happiness; see Gallup World Poll 2017). This is one of the most comprehensible and 
widely used proxy of cross-country variation in happiness based on extensive opinion sur-
veys (see Deaton 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 2013). In all regressions we add the initial 
level of happiness (for the beginning of each period, i.e. Happiness(t−1)), given that happi-
ness gains are expected to be smaller for countries with high initial happiness levels (given 
that the happiness index has an upper bound). In Column (1) we add Oil Dependence 
(measured by oil rents as a share of GDP) and income per capita (Income pc) as additional 
Table 1  Changes in happiness and natural resource dependence
Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Time dummies included in all specifications
*, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance
Dependent vari-
able
ΔHappiness (1) ΔHappiness (2) ΔHappiness (3) ΔHappiness (4) ΔHappiness (5)
Constant − 0.09 − 0.58 0.27 0.15 0.44
Happiness (t − 1) − 0.41***
(0.04)
− 0.57***
(0.05)
− 0.62***
(0.05)
− 0.69***
(0.05)
− 0.70***
(0.05)
Oil dependence − 0.62*
(0.36)
− 0.83*
(0.49)
− 0.99*
(0.54)
Mineral depend-
ence
0.72
(1.09)
Agricultural 
dependence
− 0.35
(0.61)
Income pc 0.28***
(0.03)
0.42***
(0.05)
0.44***
(0.05)
0.49***
(0.05)
0.47***
(0.06)
Growth 1.35***
(0.39)
1.32**
(0.61)
1.30**
(0.56)
1.44***
(0.57)
Unemployment − 2.03***
(0.78)
− 2.07***
(0.56)
− 2.18***
(0.71)
Education − 0.74
(2.01)
0.45
(2.25)
− 0.34
(2.24)
R2 overall (within; 
between)
0.37
(0.56; 0.11)
0.40
(0.65; 0.19)
0.43
(0.69; 0.21)
0.41
(0.72; 0.19)
0.41
(0.73; 0.20)
Countries 126 121 118 136 130
N 437 322 296 333 321
6 Results available from the authors upon request.
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explanatory variables (data provided by the World Bank 2016). We find evidence of an oil-
happiness resource curse (significance at the 10% level)—a 100% difference in the share 
of oil rents in GDP is associated with a 0.62 units drop in the happiness index (over each 
3-year period). This holds when controlling for the initial level of happiness and income 
per capita (with the latter being positively and significantly associated with changes in 
happiness, as suggested by the literature, see di Tella and MacCulloch 2008). This is an 
effect of substantial magnitude, given that the − 0.62 coefficient of oil dependence refers 
to effects over a single (3-year) period that can cumulatively make a large difference over 
time. For example, a difference in oil dependency equal to 60% (which is about the size of 
the actual difference between the least and most oil dependent economies in our sample), 
that persists across all 4 subperiods, is associated with a happiness loss of approximately 
(0.62 × 0.60 × 4) one and a half happiness units over the entire 12 year period.7
In Column (2) of Table  1 we enrich our specification by adding the corresponding 
growth rate of GDP per capita for each period. The oil-happiness resource curse persists, 
while we also find that both the level and growth of per capita income are positively and 
significantly linked to happiness gains.8 In Column (3) we also add the unemployment rate 
and the share of educational expenditure in GDP (variable: education) as additional regres-
sors (data available from the International Labour Organization 2016, and United Nations 
2016, respectively). In line with earlier studies, we find unemployment to correlate nega-
tively with changes in happiness (Blanchflower et al. 2014)—on the other hand, the effect 
of education appears to be statistically insignificant (something that has been also observed 
in other studies, e.g. in Caner 2016; Flouri 2004). All earlier results hold and, the oil-hap-
piness resource curse appears to be slightly stronger—a 100% difference in the share of 
oil rents in GDP is now associated with a 0.99 units drop in the happiness index. Columns 
(4) and (5) replicate the richer specification of Column (3) for the case of (non-petroleum) 
mineral and agricultural dependence respectively. Mineral dependence is measured as the 
share of non-petroleum mineral rents (from coal, gas, oil, tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, 
nickel, silver, bauxite, phosphate etc.) in GDP (data provided by the World Bank 2016). 
Agricultural dependence is captured by the equivalent measure for agricultural production 
(data by the World Bank 2016). The happiness ‘resource curse’ curse appears to be oil-spe-
cific—the corresponding coefficients of non-petroleum minerals and agriculture are both 
non-significant (positive and negative respectively). This is also in line with other papers 
in the resource curse literature that place particular emphasis on the negative development 
effects of oil (see Sect. 3).
Table 2 checks for the stability of the oil-happiness resource curse by replicating the 
richer oil specification [Column (3) of Table  1], by first dropping the educational vari-
able (which was insignificant) and then introducing in alternate order some of the other 
happiness determinants discussed in Sect. 3 (please note, that alternative combinations of 
these regressors have no effect on the presence of a statistically-significant oil-happiness 
link; results available from the authors upon request). In Columns (6) (7), (8) and (9), we 
introduce variables capturing inflation, trade openness (the value of imports and exports in 
GDP), environmental quality (measured by the extent of carbon dioxide damage in national 
7 It is unlikely that the direction of causality runs from happiness to oil dependence, given that the latter is 
to a large extent the result of geographical factors and long-run investment in the extractive sector (which is 
also confirmed by a series of performed Granger causality tests).
8 This is in line with the so-called adaptation/habituation effect; faster growth can compensate for the fact 
that individuals tend to quickly adjust to increased income levels, di Tella et al. (2010).
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income9—the corresponding variable  CO2 can be perceived as a measure of the carbon 
intensity of production, as well as of air quality), and rule of law (measured by the cor-
responding World Governance Indicators index in the range of − 2.5 to 2.5, where higher 
values correspond to better performance in rule of law).10 With the exception of trade, the 
other control variables are statistically insignificant once controlling for other country char-
acteristics (the negative and significant trade coefficient is in line with findings from other 
empirical studies, e.g. Hessami 2011; Ovaska and Takashima 2006). More importantly, 
all regressions of Table 2 point to a negative link between oil dependence and happiness 
gains, of similar size to the one identified in Table 1.11
4.2.1  Resource Abundance
Following Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), scholars working on the development effects 
of natural resources typically make a distinction between ‘resource dependence’ and 
Table 2  Changes in happiness and oil dependence (alternative regressors)
Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Time dummies included in all specifications
*, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance
Dependent variable ΔHappiness (6) ΔHappiness (7) ΔHappiness (8) ΔHappiness (9)
Constant 0.20 0.23 0.27 − 0.45
Happiness (t − 1) − 0.62***
(0.05)
− 0.61***
(0.05)
− 0.63***
(0.05)
− 0.60***
(0.05)
Oil dependence − 0.91*
(0.52)
− 0.90*
(0.50)
− 0.91*
(0.53)
− 1.24*
(0.59)
Income pc 0.44***
(0.05)
0.44***
(0.05)
0.44***
(0.05)
0.51***
(0.07)
Growth 1.33**
(0.52)
1.39**
(0.56)
1.40**
(0.57)
1.40**
(0.55)
Unemployment − 1.94***
(0.73)
− 1.98***
(0.74)
− 2.10***
(0.73)
− 1.95***
(0.71)
Inflation 0.19
(0.59)
Trade − 0.12*
(0.07)
CO2 − 0.07
(0.15)
Rule of law − 0.14
(0.09)
R2 overall (within; between) 0.43
(0.69; 0.21)
0.43
(0.69; 0.22)
0.43
(0.69; 0.20)
0.68
(0.23; 0.43)
Countries 121 120 121 121
N 301 299 301 301
9 The World Bank estimates this at $20 per ton of carbon times the number of tons of  CO2 emitted.
10 Data for the inflation, trade and  CO2 variables are available by the World Bank (2016). The source for 
the rule of law data is WGI (2016).
11 Replicating Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 (mineral and agricultural dependence) by introducing the 
same additional regressors, does not change the earlier finding of an oil-specific happiness curse.
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‘resource abundance’ measures. The former express the value of resources in relation to 
another economic activity (for instance, exports, total income etc.)—the latter express val-
ues in terms of a non-economic exogenous variable (e.g. population or land surface) that is 
unlikely to be determined by natural wealth at least in the short term. A number of econo-
metric explorations of the resource curse find that this disappears when expressing min-
eral values in per capita terms (see, for instance, Kropf 2010; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
2008; Cavalcanti et al. 2011). Resource dependence measures tend to correlate more highly 
to resource curse phenomena, given that they capture more accurately how important the 
resource sector is relative to the rest of the economy.12 To do justice to this stream of the 
literature, we replicate the richer specifications (3)–(5) of Table 1 (for the case of oil, min-
erals and agriculture) by using the equivalent measures of resource abundance (that is, the 
natural logarithm of oil, mineral and agricultural rents in per capita terms; see Table 3). In 
line with earlier findings from this stream of the literature, we also observe that the happi-
ness-resource curse disappears for the case of oil abundant (but not necessarily dependent) 
economies, while it even turns to a blessing for the mineral and agricultural abundant ones 
[significant at the 10% level, see Columns (11) and (12)].
4.2.2  Non‑linear Resource Effects
In Table  4 we examine the presence of a non-linear relationship between the different 
measures of resource dependence and changes in happiness—Columns (13)–(15) repeat 
the specifications found in Columns (3)–(5) of Table 1 after incorporating a quadratic term 
for each of our resource dependence measures. As previously, we only find evidence of a 
resource-happiness curse for the case of oil dependence, but the results now also suggest 
that oil dependence links to happiness losses only above a specific threshold level (which, 
though, tends to be quite low, close to 13%). In other words, oil rents have the potential to 
increase happiness but, as a whole, the relationship turns negative at relatively low levels 
of oil dependency.
4.2.3  Growth‑Income Interaction
Table 5 introduces a growth-income interaction term in our key specifications [Columns 
(3)–(5) of Table 1]. In effect, this tests the so-called Easterlin paradox (Easterlin 2015), that 
hypothesises that economic growth yields smaller happiness increments above a certain 
level of economic development. Indeed, we find some evidence in support of the paradox—
economic growth translates into happiness gains for countries with a GDP per capita level 
below approximately $37,000. This is a relatively high, though, threshold level (equivalent 
to the GDP per capita found in advanced economies, such as the UK and Germany), with 
few countries, hence exceeding this income level.13 Most importantly, there is no change to 
the oil-specific happiness-resource curse that we identified in earlier regressions.
13 For a correct interpretation, one needs to keep in mind that there is also a positive indirect effect of 
growth on happiness changes, going through the income per capita variable.
12 Resource abundant economies, instead, might not necessarily be highly resource-dependent (and there-
fore vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and rent-seeking).
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4.2.4  Endogeneity Issues and Some Additional Robustness Checks
Several of the happiness explanatory variables might be endogenous (and dependent on 
either income levels or natural resource dependence). Natural resource booms and discov-
eries may for instance raise income per capita levels in the short run but negatively affect 
economic growth or institutions in the longer term (in accordance with the resource curse 
hypothesis). For this reason, we run a series of two-stage least squares regressions: in the 
first stage, potentially endogenous variables are initially regressed on exogenous instru-
mental variables (including other covariates appearing in the equation of interest), while 
in the second stage the endogenous variables are replaced with their first-stage predicted 
values. We make use of two variables as instruments: a. proximity to the tropics, captured 
by latitude (data by Hall and Jones 1999) and b. the extent of ethnic fractionalisation of 
the population (data by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; the index takes values between 
0 and 1 with lower scores corresponding to more ethnically homogenous societies). Both 
have been extensively used in empirical cross-country analysis as proxies that can address 
the possible endogeneity of several intermediate variables (e.g. for the use of latitude as 
an instrument for income per capita and institutions, see Angeles and Neanidis 2015 and 
Cooray and Schneider 2016; for the use of ethnic fractionalisation as an instrument for 
income per capita and institutions, see Faria and Montesinos 2009 and Mauro 1995).
Table 6 replicates Column (3) of Table 1 in a two-stage least squares setting for alterna-
tive endogenous variables. In Columns (19) and (20), we use latitude and ethnic fraction-
alisation to instrument for income per capita and growth respectively. The coefficient of 
oil dependence (in the happiness regression) is of similar size and remains statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level (suggesting hence, that the relationship between oil and happiness 
is robust and statistically significant even when addressing the potential endogeneity of 
income per capita and growth). In Columns (21)–(24), we consecutively include four addi-
tional regressors in our main happiness specification (the Gini coefficient of income ine-
quality, democracy, government effectiveness, control of corruption), which also become 
instrumented with latitude and ethnic fractionalisation. These aim to check whether oil 
dependence may influence changes in happiness primarily via eroding democratic account-
ability and institutional quality (or creating less egalitarian societies). The coefficient of oil 
dependence (for the happiness regressions) remains statistically significant.
Although the primary focus is on the second stage (i.e. the link between changes in hap-
piness on oil dependence), it is worth briefly mentioning some key results from the first-
stage regressions. Oil dependence appears to augment income per capita [Column (19)], 
reduce income inequality [Column (21)], hamper democracy [Column (22)] and decrease 
institutional quality (Columns 23–24)—however, as mentioned above, the coefficient of 
oil in the second-stage happiness regressions remains consistently statistically significant 
(suggesting, hence, that the effect of oil dependence on happiness losses cannot be attrib-
uted, at least primarily, to its indirect links with other explanatory variables).
Furthermore, Table  7 provides some further robustness checks regarding the link 
between changes in happiness and oil dependence. Columns (25) and (26) repeat Column 
(3) of Table 1 but now separately for developing and developed economies (using a GDP 
per capita level of $12,000 as the threshold level). The negative effect of oil dependence 
appears to be much stronger in the case of developing economies. We also find similar 
evidence for the countries located in the tropics (i.e. those countries located 23.5 degrees 
north/south of the Equator). Column (28) focuses on the years of the global financial cri-
sis (hence, only the latest two subperiods of analysis: 2006–2009 and 2009–2012)—the 
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negative effect of oil dependence on happiness is stronger during this period (the coef-
ficient is about half the size in the two preceding periods).14 Controlling for exchange rate 
movements (namely the devaluation of local currency against the US dollar), also does not 
influence considerably the oil coefficient [see Column (29)].
4.3  A Synthesis of Results
Our research aims at investigating the links between changes in happiness across coun-
tries and several measures of resource wealth. We find evidence of an oil-happiness 
resource curse; countries with economies largely dependent on oil find it harder to 
improve the average happiness levels of their citizens over time (Tables 1, 2). A heavy 
reliance on other minerals or agriculture, however, has no statistically significant effect 
on changes in happiness (Table 1). We also find that it is the relative importance of the 
oil sector in the economy that matters—when oil rents are expressed in per capita terms 
(rather than as a share of GDP), the oil-happiness resource curse disappears (Table 3). 
In addition, our results suggest that oil dependence links to happiness losses only when 
oil rents account for more than 13% of GDP; it is only when economies rely exces-
sively on the oil industry that countries fail to improve average happiness (Table  4). 
Table 3  Changes in happiness and natural resource abundance
Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Time dummies included in all specifications
*, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance
Dependent variable ΔHappiness (10) ΔHappiness (11) ΔHappiness (12)
Constant 0.20 0.13 − 0.68
Happiness (t − 1) − 0.62***
(0.05)
− 0.69***
(0.05)
− 0.70***
(0.05)
Oil abundance 0.004
(0.10)
Mineral abundance 0.02**
(0.01)
Agricultural abundance 0.11**
(0.05)
Income pc 0.44***
(0.05)
0.49***
(0.05)
0.47***
(0.06)
Growth 1.26**
(0.62)
1.25**
(0.56)
1.43***
(0.57)
Unemployment − 1.99***
(0.75)
− 2.32***
(0.64)
− 2.13***
(0.64)
Education − 0.20
(2.00)
0.29
(2.10)
− 0.32
(2.12)
R2 overall (within; between) 0.42
(0.67; 0.19)
0.41
(0.73; 0.19)
0.42
(0.73; 0.20)
Countries 118 136 130
N 296 333 321
14 Results available from the authors upon request.
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Our analysis also points to the significant role of other variables in explaining improve-
ments in happiness across countries. Richer and fast-growing economies find it easier to 
improve average happiness levels (Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4); however, there is evidence of a 
non-linear effect, with economic growth supporting happiness gains only for countries 
with a GDP per capita level below approximately $37,000 (Table 5). Non-resource vari-
ables may be endogenous (and affected by other explanatory variables); instrumental 
variable techniques, however, still verify that oil dependence is negatively associated 
with changes in happiness (Table 6). In addition, the oil-happiness link appears to be 
stronger in the case of developing economies (Table 7). This robust evidence of an oil-
specific happiness curse provides support to the theoretical rationale put forth in Sect. 2 
of the paper; oil-dependent economies may find it more difficult, other things equal, to 
translate resource rents into happiness gains. This effect is likely to be the combined 
result of overall macroeconomic mismanagement, poor institutions, limited economic 
diversification, increased exposure to price shocks and volatility, and an unequal distri-
bution of revenues from the extractive sector.
Table 4  Changes in happiness and natural resource dependence (quadratic terms)
Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Time dummies included in all specifications
*, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance
Dependent variable ΔHappiness (13) ΔHappiness (14) ΔHappiness (15)
Constant 0.12 0.15 − 0.23
Happiness (t − 1) − 0.60***
(0.05)
− 0.69***
(0.05)
− 0.72***
(0.05)
Oil dependence 1.63*
(0.99)
Oil dependence squared − 6.26**
(2.77)
Mineral dependence 1.17
(2.43)
Mineral dependence squared − 2.32
(10.28)
Agricultural dependence 1.97
(2.02)
Agricultural dependence squared − 3.96
(2.92)
Income pc 0.44***
(0.05)
0.49***
(0.05)
0.54***
(0.08)
Growth 1.37**
(0.59)
1.30**
(0.56)
1.39**
(0.59)
Unemployment − 2.06***
(0.72)
− 2.07***
(0.57)
− 2.22***
(0.68)
Education − 0.36
(1.98)
0.43
(2.22)
− 0.27
(2.17)
R2 overall (within; between) 0.44
(0.67; 0.24)
0.41
(0.72; 0.19)
0.42
(0.73; 0.20)
Countries 118 136 130
N 296 333 321
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5  Happiness Levels and Resource Wealth
In this section we extend our analysis by looking at how happiness levels (rather than 
changes over time) correlate with our measures of resource affluence. In Sect. 4 we found 
evidence showing that oil-rich nations tend to experience happiness losses over time, other 
things equal—here, we examine whether these nations also rank lower in the global hap-
piness distribution. Figure 2 replicates our earlier Fig. 1 for happiness levels in 2012. The 
horizontal red line corresponds to the average happiness level for the entire sample (5.9). 
High levels of happiness appear both for oil rich and scarce economies; however, one can 
also observe that for high levels of oil dependence (where oil accounts for more than 10% 
of GDP), there is a proportionately larger share of countries lying below the sample-aver-
age happiness level.
Columns (30)–(32) of Table 8 replicate the last three columns of Table 1 (which include 
the three resource dependence indices), with the level of happiness as the dependent vari-
able. Columns (33)–(35) repeat these specifications for the resource abundance measures. 
Only two resource wealth indices appear to be statistically significant. Agriculture abun-
dance correlates positively with happiness levels, other things equal (Column (35))—on 
the other hand, oil dependent economies score lower in the global happiness ranking [Col-
umn (30)]. In the case of oil dependence, the effect though is not of a substantial mag-
nitude; a difference in resource dependence between a country entirely dependent on oil 
Table 5  Changes in happiness and resource dependence (growth-income interaction term)
Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Time dummies included in all specifications
*, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance
Dependent variable ΔHappiness (16) ΔHappiness (17) ΔHappiness (18)
Constant 0.02 − 0.10 0.38
Happiness (t − 1) − 0.62***
(0.05)
− 0.69***
(0.05)
− 0.70***
(0.05)
Oil dependence − 0.92*
(0.55)
Minerals 0.82
(1.07)
Agriculture − 0.69
(0.65)
Income pc 0.46***
(0.06)
0.52***
(0.05)
0.48***
(0.06)
Growth 6.11*
(3.35)
6.58**
(2.81)
7.99***
(2.75)
Growth * income pc − 0.58*
(0.37)
− 0.65**
(0.32)
− 0.81**
(0.32)
Unemployment − 1.82**
(0.79)
− 1.84***
(0.57)
− 2.01***
(0.72)
Education − 0.56
(1.96)
0.59
(2.17)
− 0.39
(2.12)
R2 overall (within; between) 0.43
(0.70; 0.21)
0.41
(0.73; 0.19)
0.42
(0.74; 0.20)
Countries 118 136 130
N 296 333 321
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and one with no oil resources (i.e. a difference equal to 100%) would only imply a lower 
happiness level for the former by 0.76 units. This suggests, that although oil dependence 
results in happiness losses over time (see Sect. 4), this has still not been translated into a 
Table 7  Changes in happiness and oil dependence (some further robustness checks)
Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Time dummies included in all specifications
*, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance
Dependent variable: 
ΔHappiness
Developing 
countries (25)
Developed 
countries (26)
Tropics (27) Global financial 
crisis (28)
Exchange 
rates (29)
Constant 0.49 − 1.39 − 0.39 − 0.57 0.38
Happiness (t − 1) − 0.63***
(0.06)
− 0.38***
(0.08)
− 0.67***
(0.09)
− 0.60***
(0.06)
− 0.60***
(0.06)
Oil dependence − 1.42**
(0.63)
− 0.25
(0.44)
− 2.06**
(0.93)
− 1.00*
(0.55)
− 1.01*
(0.54)
Income pc 0.44***
(0.07)
0.40***
(0.11)
0.60***
(0.14)
0.44***
(0.06)
0.43***
(0.06)
Growth 1.05
(0.79)
1.99***
(0.67)
1.65
(1.34)
1.44**
(0.54)
0.61
(0.54)
Unemployment − 1.74**
(0.89)
− 2.60*
(1.96)
− 1.05
(1.33)
− 2.11***
(0.89)
− 1.86**
(0.83)
Education − 2.02
(2.36)
0.24
(2.72)
− 5.15 (4.98) 0.95
(2.02)
0.72
(2.43)
Exchange rate  
(depreciation)
0.09
(0.19)
R2 overall (within; 
between)
0.43
(0.68; 0.32)
0.56
(0.71; 0.15)
0.28
(0.74; 0.07)
0.41
(0.71; 0.20)
0.42
(0.68; 0.21)
Countries 81 42 49 118 118
N 192 104 109 234 296
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Fig. 2  Happiness and oil dependence. Note: Abbreviations correspond to 3-letter country ISO codes
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significant downgrade of oil-rich nations in the global happiness distribution. This is simi-
lar to what economists observe when looking at the resource curse through the lens of the 
income per capita distribution—while oil-rich nations tend to grow at a slower pace, they 
still do not score much lower in the global income per capita distribution, other things 
equal (see Carmignani and Chowdhury 2012).
6  Conclusions
There has been a growing interest in recent years in the ‘resource curse’, and more gen-
erally in the relationship between natural resources and several welfare indices. In paral-
lel (but regrettably independently) a separate empirical literature in recent decades has 
probed into the determinants of happiness and subjective well-being (using either country 
or household data). To our knowledge, this is the first empirical attempt to bring these two 
separate strands of the literature together. Consistent with prior empirical evidence of a 
resource curse in oil-rich nations, we find that oil rents are negatively linked to improve-
ments in happiness over time. This happiness ‘resource curse’ curse appears to be oil-spe-
cific and holds both for the levels as well as changes in happiness.
These findings have significant policy implications for oil-rich nations. Governments in 
these countries need to take corrective actions that improve the average life satisfaction of 
their citizens (in line with the discussion of Sects. 2 and 3—i.e. by ensuring a more equita-
ble distribution of oil rents, more transparency and accountability, efficient bureaucracies 
etc.). The extractive industry needs to be actively involved in such debates to ensure that 
any ancillary benefits are enhanced (e.g. in terms of local employment, infrastructure etc.), 
while any negative externalities (e.g. regarding displacement of local communities, environ-
mental impacts) are minimised. More broadly, policy-makers and researchers need to realise 
that the resource curse focus needs to shift from the immediate (and often more visible) 
growth effects towards broader welfare impacts—in other words, any development strategy 
based on extraction needs to critically reflect on the intended use of accrued resource rents 
and the distributive aspects of associated policies. We argue that measured happiness would 
make a better target for government policy (in oil rich states but not only) than GDP. This 
stresses the necessity of improving the data reliability of happiness measures in the future 
(ideally across multiple dimensions of human well-being) and creating adjusted GDP values 
that incorporate elements of well-being typically ignored in national accounts (e.g. envi-
ronmental and social externalities, informal production, inequality in income and access to 
resources etc.). By construction, existing happiness indices are constrained by an upper and 
lower bound—in other words, while individuals and countries can perpetually get wealthier 
(at least in theory), increases in happiness cannot be without limits.
The relationship between natural resource management and several measures of socio-
economic development is intriguing but certainly a complex one (as evident from the num-
ber of empirical analyses on the issue in the last two decades)—our paper is simply a first 
attempt to explore the fascinating relationship between oil rents and happiness. Several limi-
tations remain. Future empirical work could attempt to unravel the channels (mechanisms) 
through which natural resources can affect happiness levels and changes. In addition, our 
happiness index is simply an average and, hence, does not reveal any information about the 
distribution and inequality of perceived well-being levels within each country’s population. 
Case studies and more disaggregated econometric models should complement the more 
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aggregate country-specific analysis by examining the localised effects of oil presence (e.g. 
as in the case of environmental externalities or employment creation). In addition, it might 
be the case that the scale used to measure happiness is perceived differently within different 
cultural contexts and subnational studies may be more suitable for comparison purposes. 
Furthermore, the subperiods of our analysis have a relatively short time span (of 4 years)—
longer time series will allow in the future to uncover relationships that are less likely to be 
influenced by short-term fluctuations (in happiness and other explanatory variables).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1
See Table 9.
Table 9  List of countries in 
sample Albania Iran Tajikistan
Algeria Iraq Thailand
Angola Ireland Togo
Argentina Israel Trinidad and Tobago
Armenia Italy Tunisia
Australia Jamaica Turkey
Austria Japan Ukraine
Azerbaijan Jordan United Kingdom
Bangladesh Kazakhstan United States
Belarus Kenya Uruguay
Belize Kuwait Uzbekistan
Belgium Kyrgyz Republic Venezuela
Benin Latvia Vietnam
Bolivia Lebanon Yemen, Rep.
Botswana Lithuania Zambia
Brazil Luxembourg Zimbabwe
Bulgaria Malaysia
Cambodia Malta
Cameroon Mauritania
Canada Mexico
Chad Mongolia
Chile Morocco
China Mozambique
Colombia Namibia
Congo, Dem. Rep. Nepal
Congo, Rep. Netherlands
Costa Rica New Zealand
Croatia Nicaragua
Cuba Nigeria
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Appendix 2
See Table 10.
Countries appearing in specification 3 of Table 1
Table 9  (continued) Cyprus Norway
Czech Republic Pakistan
Denmark Panama
Dominican Republic Paraguay
Ecuador Peru
Egypt Philippines
El Salvador Poland
Estonia Portugal
Ethiopia Romania
Finland Russia
France Saudi Arabia
Georgia Senegal
Germany Serbia
Ghana Singapore
Greece Slovakia
Guatemala Slovenia
Haiti South Africa
Honduras Spain
Hungary Sri Lanka
Iceland Sudan
India Sweden
Indonesia Switzerland
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Appendix 3
See Table 11. 
Table 11  List of variables used in regressions
Happiness Average reported satisfaction with life of the residents of each coun-
try. Scale from 0 to 10—larger values correspond to higher levels 
of happiness. Source: Gallup World Poll (2017)
Oil dependence Oil rents as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank (2016)
Mineral dependence Non-petroleum mineral rents (from coal, gas, oil, tin, gold, lead, 
zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, phosphate etc.) in GDP. 
Source: World Bank (2016)
Agricultural dependence Value of agricultural production in GDP. Source: World Bank 
(2016)
Oil/mineral/agricultural abundance The log of oil/mineral/agricultural in per capita terms. Source: 
World Bank (2016)
Income pc The log of real GDP per capita at 2010 international prices. Source: 
World Bank (2016)
Growth Growth in real GDP per capita. Source: World Bank (2016)
Unemployment Unemployment as a share of total labour force. Source: Interna-
tional Labour Organization (2016)
Education Total educational expenditure as a share of total income. Source: 
United Nations (2016)
Inflation Annual inflation rate (based on GDP deflator, 2010 base year). 
Source: World Bank (2016)
Trade Share of total value of imports and exports in GDP. Source: World 
Bank (2016)
Exchange rate (depreciation) Percentage change in official exchange rate for each period (local 
currency per US). Positive values denote depreciation. Source: 
World Bank (2016)
Democracy 0–1 liberal democracy index (capturing the importance of protect-
ing individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state). 
The index measures the quality of democracy by the limits placed 
on government. Source V-Dem (2017)
Rule of law Rule of law index that captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. − 2.5 to 2.5 scale—higher values correspond to better 
performance in rule of law. Source: WGI (2016)
Government effectiveness The government effectiveness index captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures. − 2.5 to 2.5 
scale—higher values correspond to better performance in rule of 
law. Source: WGI (2016)
Control of corruption Control of corruption index that captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
state by elites and private interests. − 2.5 to 2.5 scale—higher val-
ues correspond to lower levels of corruption. Source: WGI (2016)
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Appendix 4
See Table 12.
Table 12  Descriptive statistics
Between (cross-country) and within (cross-time) standard deviations inside parentheses
Variable Mean Standard deviation—over-
all (between, within)
Minimum Maximum
ΔHappiness − 0.167 0.741 (0.419, 0.687) − 3.1 2.2
Happiness (t − 1) 5.903 1.256 (1.161, 0.519) 2.4 9.1
Oil Dependence 0.063 0.130 (0.124, 0.040) 0 0.558
Mineral Dependence 0.035 0.038 (0.031, 0.019) 0 0.355
Agricultural dependence 0.014 0.135 (0.133, 0.035) 0 0.654
Income pc 8.397 1.525 (1.506, 0.219) 5.143 11.543
Unemployment 0.086 0.062 (0.059, 0.018) 0.001 0.373
Education 0.042 0.026 (0.023, 0.013) 0.004 0.366
Inflation 0.251 2.693 (1.070, 2.461) − 0.276 62.612
Trade 0.887 0.527 (0.485, 0.192) 0.002 4.450
Exchange Rate (Depreciation) 0.307 1.419 (0.693, 1.245) − 7.007 22.933
CO2 0.003 0.003 (0.002, 0.001) 0.001 0.025
Democracy 0.411 0.273 (0.265, 0.078) 0.012 0.902
Rule of Law − 0.009 0.998 (0.986, 0.194) − 2.450 2.120
Government effectiveness − 0.022 0.997 (0.984, 0.199) − 2.260 2.281
Control of corruption − 0.024 1.001 (0.984, 0.214) − 1.914 2.485
Oil abundance 6.027 4.736 (4.694, 0.727) 0 14.775
Mineral abundance 3.809 3.846 (3.476, 1.654) 0 12.616
Agricultural abundance 10.383 1.047 (1.052, 0.216) 0 12.708
Gini 40.223 9.536 (9.118, 3.518) 16.64 73.9
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.437 0.277 (0.277, 0) 0.01 0.96
Latitude 26.614 17.015 (17.015, 0) 0 72
Table 11  (continued)
CO2 Carbon dioxide damage in national income. Source: World Bank 
(2016)
Gini Gini index of income inequality. Source: UNU-Wider (2017)
Ethnic fractionalisation Ethnic fractionalisation index (0–1 continuous scale, with higher 
values corresponding to more ethnically heterogeneous societies). 
Source: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of a country. Source: Hall and 
Jones (1999)
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